## off

#### ‘For’ means a specific correlation with energy production

OED 89 Oxford English Dictionary v3 2nd Ed for (FBT(r),fe(r)), prep, and conj. Also 2 fer, 3 south, vor, Orm. forr..

VIII. Of correspondence or correlation. 24. Prefixed to the designation of a number or quantity to which another is stated to correspond in some different relation. (Cf. similar use of to.) 1399 LANGL. Rich. Redeles II, 42 For on pat \*e merkyd jc missed ten schore Of homeliche hertis. 1583 T. WATSON Centurie of Loue xcvii. (Arb.) 133 For cu'ry pleasure that in Loue is found, A thousand woes and more therein abound. 1674 N. Cox Genii. Recreat. v. (1686) d, I will undertake to shew any man Twenty other Hornet, lame .. for one Hunter. 1734 DE FOE Mem. Cavalier (1840) 255 They were.. twice our number in the whole; and their foot three for one. .806-7 J - BERESFOKD Miseries Hum. Life (1826) vi. xxxvii, It contains.. for one inch of lean four or five of stringy fat. 1887 L. CARROLL Game of Logic i. §3- 32 For one workable Pair of Premisses .. you will probably find five that lead to no Conclusion at all.

#### Violation: The entity receives the incentive in cases where energy is not produced, or may fail to receive it despite energy being produced, which undermines the specific correlation in the word “for

#### Voting issue

**Extra topicality** – allowing a policy mix to includes extra topical elements undermines predictability – counterplan remedies overdetermine neg strategy – the topic as worded fails on sufficiency grounds – severance means negatives never win. And/or shell games amplify this:

**Words & Phrases, 2007** (Permanent Edition, 2007, vol 3A, p.220)

N.D.Cal. 1942. Under livestock transit policy covering livestock while stopped in transit at feeding station to comply with the law, but not while "stoppage and/or detention" are pursuant to direction of insured or his representative, and rider limiting liability for loss of lambs to period of 12 hours after arrival for feeding in transit yards, insurer was not liable for loss of lambs by fire in feeding in transit yard 25 hours after they were unloaded and after consignee changed their destination, on ground that it was necessary that the word "and" alone should be read into the phrase "and/or" and the "or" excluded. —McPherrin v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 44 F.Supp. 674.—Insurance 2160(3).

**Predictable Limits** – the topic could easily become “do anything to cause energy X” – nuclear energy alone is too big for preparation without limiting mechanisms for predictability. All energies have loan mechanisms with limitations in the SQ, so you can access each energy type without undermining educational depth in the mechanism debate. Our interp assures that the incentives are expanded in both size and scope to overcome uniqueness tricks and refocus debate on substance.

## off

#### Production misdefines the problem – profit explains their impacts & guts solvency

Chien 74 Chang Chien, @ the Peking Review, “Behind the So-Called “Energy Crisis”, March 15th, 1974, http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1974/PR1974-11a.htm

THE major capitalist countries are going through a serious “energy crisis.” The oil supply shortage has caused production and living conditions to be affected by a “petroleum shock.” Prices are soaring in step with oil prices and stocks are falling in the face of bleak economic prospects. International political and economic relations also have been influenced by the “energy crisis.” The situation is being widely discussed. Some bourgeois newspapers and journals abroad blamed the “energy crisis” on an “exhaustion of energy resources” while others absurdly reproached the Arab people with using oil as a weapon. These assertions which evade the heart of the matter or shift the responsibility on to other people are simply designed to create confusion and mislead people. What is it really all about? The current “energy crisis” takes mainly the form of an insufficient supply of oil. While on the surface it may be a question of natural resources, in reality this is absolutely not so. The world’s energy resources, including those of the main capitalist countries, are plentiful. Furthermore, with the development of production and the steady rise of human knowledge, people are discovering and will continue to discover new sources of energy. In essence, the “energy crisis” gripping the capitalist world is a reflection of the crisis of the capitalist system, an outcome of the sharpening contradictions within the capitalist-imperialisi system, and a result of the monopoly capitalists’ ruthless exploitation and nefarious plunder of the people at home and abroad; today, it is also a direct result of unbridled foreign expansion and rivalry for world hegemony by the two superpowers, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Under the capitalist system, “production of surplus-value is the absolute law of this mode of production” (Marx, Capital). The nature of the monopoly capitalist class is to seek fabulous monopoly profits. In exploiting energy resources, the capitalists do not consider the rational use of natural resources but only seek maximum profits. The decrease and increase of the various energy resources often depend on the amount of profit they give. Once the main source of energy, coal was known as the “food of industry.” Today, though there we still very rich deposits of coal, the industry in general has declined in the leading capitalist countries. Even in the United States, which has the biggest reserves, coal accounts for only one-fifth of its energy production. The reason is that as it is much more profitable to exploit oil than to mine coal, the capitalists have, therefore, preferred to set coal aside. Although, oil c also be extracted from oil shale and oil sand, they have not been exploited proprely, because the capitalists are not interested; they find that extracting oil from shale and sand is less profitable than direct oil exploitation and therefore cannot satisfy their ravenous appetites. Capitalism means waste. In the capitalist world, large quantities of petroleum are wasted because of anarchy in production and general wastefulness in life. A large amount of precious oil has been freely abandoned underground because indiscriminate drilling destroyed oil-bearing formations, or because pressures were lowered so much by drawing oil recklessly that it no longer could be made to flow out, etc. It is estimated that the present rate of oil recovery is only 35 per cent in the United States. In other words, for every ton of oil obtained, two tons are abandoned. As to lavish waste in consumption, this is even more shocking. Nowadays, electricity for non-productive use in the capitalist countries takes up one-third to one-half their total electric power output. The U.S. press admits that half the energy consumption in the United States is wasted. Wild arms expansion and war preparations by imperialism and social-imperialism and their wars of aggression are bottomless pits in consuming and squandering oil. This is the basic reason why the “energy crisis” has hit the so-called developed capitalist countries when the world’s energy resources have never been so rich and varied as they are today. As some Americans say, the blame lies not with Mother Nature but with Uncle Sam. Imperialism means aggression and plunder. In view of the economic and strategic importance of oil and also because it is more profitable to grab oil abroad than to exploit it at home, the monopoly capitalists often leave domestic oil unexploited and swarm to plunder the oil of the Third World countries. They have a special interest in the Middle East which has rich oil deposits and occupies an important strategic position politically and geographically. Two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are in the Middle East. Cost of exploitation there is very low as the oil beds are fairly shallow, the rate of success in well drilling is high, output is big and labour is cheap. For example, in Kuwait the cost of extracting one ton of oil is only one-twentieth of that in the United States. Middle East oil has become a golden stream yielding fabulous profits for foreign monopoly capitalists. The Middle East has long been a centre of contention among the imperialist countries. Since World War II, the United States has replaced Britain as the biggest plunderer of Middle East oil resources. At present, U.S. monopoly capitalists control more than half the Middle East’s oil production. Direct U.S. private investments in Middle East oil amounted to 1,800 million dollars by the end of 1972 whereas U.S. profits from the investments was 2,400 million dollars that year alone. The profit rate was as high as 130 per cent, or 10 times the average for all overseas U.S. investments. The temporary and false prosperity of the imperialist countries in postwar years is built on the natural resources and the blood and sweat of the people of the Third World.

#### Extinction

Meszaros, prof Philosophy & Political Theory, 95

Istvan Meszaros, 1995, Professor at University of Sussex, England, “Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition”

With regard to its innermost determination the capital system is expansion oriented and accumulation-driven. Such a determination constitutes both a formerly unimaginable dynamism and a fateful deficiency. In this sense, as a system of social metabolic control capital is quite irresistible for as long as it can successfully extract and accumulate surplus-labour-whether in directly economic or in primarily political form- in the course of the given society’s expandoed reproduction. Once, however, this dynamic process of expansion and accumulation gets stuck (for whatever reason) the consequences must be quite devastating. For even under the ‘normality’ of relatively limited cyclic disturbances and blockages the destruction that goes with the ensuing socioeconomic and political crises can be enormous, as the annals of the twentieth century reveal it, including two world wars (not to mention numerous smaller conflagrations). It is therefore not too difficult to imagine the implications of a systemic, truly structural crisis; i.e. one that affects the global capital system not simply under one if its aspects-the financial/monetary one, for instance-but in all its fundamental dimensions, questioning its viability altogether as a social reproductive system. Under the conditions of capital's structural crisis its destructive constituents come to the fore with a vengeance, activating the spectre of total uncontrollability in a form that foreshadows self-destruction both for this unique social reproductive system itself and for humanity in general. As we shall see in Chapter 3, capital was near amenable to proper and durable control or rational self-restraint.

#### Reject on ethics

**Zizek and Daly 2k4** (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears).This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’).

#### Alt: withdraw completely from the ideology of capitalism

**Johnston**, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, 200**4**  Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it--capitalism's life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism's frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic's fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Zizek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing

#### Alt solves the root cause; plan’s incrementalism gets rolled back

http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strategy/GettingFree/ A Sketch of An Association of Democratic, Autonomous Neighborhoods And How to Create It And Other Essays Plus An Annotated Bibliography in English for the Libertarian Left By Jared **James 2002**

10. Single-issue campaigns. We cannot destroy capitalism with single-issue campaigns. Yet the great bulk of the energies of radicals is spent on these campaigns. There are dozens of them: campaigns to preserve the forests, keep rent control, stop whaling, stop animal experiments, defend abortion rights, stop toxic dumping, stop the killing of baby seals, stop nuclear testing, stop smoking, stop pornography, stop drug testing, stop drugs, stop the war on drugs, stop police brutality, stop union busting, stop red-lining, stop the death penalty, stop racism, stop sexism, stop child abuse, stop the re-emerging slave trade, stop the bombing of Yugoslavia, stop the logging of redwoods, stop the spread of advertising, stop the patenting of genes, stop the trapping and killing of animals for furs, stop irradiated meat, stop genetically modified foods, stop human cloning, stop the death squads in Colombia, stop the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, stop the extermination of species, stop corporations from buying politicians, stop high stakes educational testing, stop the bovine growth hormone from being used on milk cows, stop micro radio from being banned, stop global warming, stop the militarization of space, stop the killing of the oceans, and on and on. What we are doing is spending our lives trying to fix up a system which generates evils far faster than we can ever eradicate them. Although some of these campaigns use direct action (e.g., spikes in the trees to stop the chain saws or Greenpeace boats in front of the whaling ships to block the harpoons), for the most part the campaigns are directed at passing legislation in Congress to correct the problem. Unfortunately, reforms that are won in one decade, after endless agitation, can be easily wiped off the books the following decade, after the protesters have gone home, or after a new administration comes to power. These struggles all have value and are needed. Could anyone think that the campaigns against global warming, or to free Leonard Peltier, or to aid the East Timorese ought to be abandoned? Single issue campaigns keep us aware of what's wrong, and sometimes even win. But in and of themselves, they cannot destroy capitalism, and thus cannot really fix things. It is utopian to believe that we can reform capitalism. Most of these evils can only be eradicated for good if we destroy capitalism itself and create a new civilization. We cannot afford to aim for anything less. Our very survival is at stake. There is one single-issue campaign I can wholehearted endorse: the total and permanent eradication of capitalism.

#### Reject the method of the 1AC

James **Marsh, 1995** (Critique, Action, and Liberation, p. 333-335)

To the extent, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason but the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factual, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted, topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.'2 A rationality, however, that confines itself to understanding the facts and accepting the facts as normal cannot pierce the veil. Indeed, piercing the veil becomes irrational according to such a definition of reason.

## off

#### The history of nuclear power is one rooted in exceptionalism- the distinction between peaceful nuclear development and proliferation risks is often only founded on where the tech was created

Hecht 2010 [Gabrielle is associate professor of history at the University of Michigan, January Technology and Culture¶ Volume 51, Number 1, Project Muse]

The salience of "uranium from Africa"—both in the lead-up to the war and in subsequent opposition to it—traded on three sets of fears and assumptions widespread in the American public sphere:¶ • the fear of nuclear weapons, and the assumption that acquiring "uranium" is tantamount to building an atomic bomb;¶ • the fear of "Africa" as a dark, corrupt continent, and the assumption that actions there are ultimately unknowable or incomprehensible;¶ • the fear of any nuclear materials not within direct Western control, and the assumption that the difference between licit and illicit nuclear trade is clear-cut.¶ Commentators on the Iraq war spilled a lot of ink on the first of these, very little on the second, and only a bit more on the third. But they largely missed the complex technological and political threads that bind these three outlooks together.¶ In this essay I attempt to break these restraints by offering three genealogies for "uranium from Africa." First, I consider the problem of when uranium counts as a "nuclear" thing, when it doesn't, and what Africa has to do with it. Before "uranium" becomes weapons-usable, it must be mined as ore, processed into yellowcake, converted into uranium hexafluoride, enriched, and pressed into bomb fuel. At what stage in this process does it come to count as a "nuclear material"? The answer, I argue, has depended on time, place, purpose, and markets. Second, I excavate the phrase's more specific rendition, displaying fragments of a history of "yellowcake from Niger." Places matter. Niger is not merely an avatar for global threats, but a nation with its own politics, priorities, and conflicts, all of which have significant [End Page 2] bearing on the production and distribution of its uranium. Third, I examine another moment when African provenance of uranium was geopolitically contested: the flow of Namibian uranium to the U.S., Japan, and Europe during the height of international sanctions against apartheid. In this instance, licit trade and black markets were materially entwined in ways that made African things invisible.¶ Understanding the transnational networks that shape the power of technology in the contemporary world is a complex and difficult proposition. Only a bird's-eye view can reveal the patterns, flows, and imbalances that map the distribution of technologies and the powers they serve or exert. Yet the view from above is always partial; it runs the risk of deceiving us into thinking that some places don't matter enough to deserve our attention. This is a dangerous illusion. We must land in unfamiliar places and study them on their own terms.¶ The result is necessarily a fractured history. The fault lines between these multiple narratives gape because transnational history is not smooth and seamless, but uneven and disjointed. As shifting signifiers, nuclearity and markets run through these histories; their meanings are shaped by place, but not always in the same way. The notion of technopolitics helps to highlight such shifts and indeterminacies. Elsewhere, I have used the term in discussions of politically strategic technological design.5 Here I use it more expansively, seeking to highlight the distribution of power in material things and symbolic circulations. These hybrid forms of power, I argue, make some things nuclear, some things commodities, some things African, and some things all three.¶ Is Uranium a Nuclear Thing?¶ Nuclear exceptionalism has been a recurring theme in political discourse since the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. American and European cold warriors and their activist opponents portrayed atomic weapons as fundamentally different from any other human creation. "The bomb" appeared as the ultimate trump card: first for the superpowers, then for waning colonial powers, then for other nations. Geopolitical status seemed directly proportional to the number of nukes a nation possessed. Such nuclear exceptionalism went well beyond discourse; indeed, its technopolitical qualities made it particularly robust. "Nuclear" scientists and engineers gained prestige, power, and funding far beyond their colleagues in "conventional" research. Fission meant splitting atoms, and the resulting rupture in nature's very building blocks propelled claims to a corresponding rupture in historical space and time. [End Page 3]¶ Nuclear exceptionalism could be made, unmade, and remade. In the early decades of civilian nuclear power, exceptionalist claims came primarily from experts and atomic energy institutions. As anti-nuclear groups gained prominence, however, they articulated their own exceptionalist claims by highlighting the unprecedented qualitative and quantitative dangers posed by exposure to radioactive substances. In response, the industry sought to make itself mundane: radioactivity was part of nature, nuclear power merely a form of energy among others. When reactor accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) challenged the banality of nuclear things, experts re-branded exceptionalism: the industry, they argued, spent more money preventing deaths from occupational exposure than any other industry. Whatever the political leaning, the stakes of exceptionalism were amplified by morality-talk: nuclear things were either sacred or profane. Whatever the political leaning, too, exceptionalist claims carried the sense that an immutable ontology distinguished the nuclear from the non-nuclear, that the difference was ultimately a clear-cut matter of fission and radioactivity.6¶ Historically, however, the degree to which—and purpose for which—a nation, a program, a technology, or a material counted as "nuclear" hasn't always been a matter of consensus. Consider: Yellowcake from Niger made Iraq nuclear enough to justify war in 2003. But in 1995, yellowcake didn't suffice to make Niger itself nuclear. According to an Office of Technology Assessment report that year, neither Niger, nor Gabon, nor Namibia had any "nuclear activities." Yet together, these three nations accounted for about a quarter of the world's uranium production that year.7¶ So when does uranium count as a nuclear thing? When does it lose its nuclearity? And what does Africa have to do with it?¶ These questions were present from the beginning of attempts to define, regulate, and market a global nuclear order, via the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency's 1956 statute allocated five permanent seats on its Board of Governors to states globally deemed the "most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials," and another five according to geographic region.8 Uranium "producers" in Eastern and Western bloc nations would rotate through another two seats; "suppliers of technical assistance" would rotate through one. Remaining board members would be elected by delegates from all IAEA member states. [End Page 4]¶ In those initial negotiations, the South African delegate had pushed hard to include "source materials" as an indicator of "advancement" in the IAEA statute.9 Contracts with the U.S. and Britain had already made uranium vital to the apartheid economy and turned South Africa into one of the world's largest producers.10 Pressures for decolonization of the African continent were mounting; the South African delegate suspected that apartheid policies would make it impossible to obtain an elected seat. As it was, India had tried to relegate South Africa to one of the rotating seats for "producers." Indeed, in 1956, South African "nuclear" activities consisted only of uranium ore production, underwritten by a very small research program; in terms of technological "advancement," this was equivalent to Portugal, Australia, and others who qualified for "producer" seats. Worse, it seemed that South Africa's competitors for the Africa/Middle East regional seat—Israel and Egypt—had more developed research programs. The Suez Crisis heightened the political risks (for the U.S. and the UK) of granting either of those countries the right to represent the whole region. But the region's choice of representative had to be technologically justified too. If "source materials" could count, then South Africa would easily qualify as the region's "most advanced [nation] in the technology of atomic energy"—not the least because the other African producers were not (yet) nations. This argument carried the day; South Africa won its seat.¶ So in 1956 "source materials" included uranium ore, which in turn seemed nuclear enough to trump the increasingly vocal opposition of postcolonial nations to the apartheid state. But this didn't compel the nuclearity of uranium ore to remain stable for all time.¶ Let's not forget why South Africans craved a board seat: they wanted to influence the formation of a uranium market. Today's media cover the IAEA primarily as the UN's "nuclear watchdog," conducting inspections to certify that civilian installations haven't been diverted to military ends. But this function of the IAEA emerged historically; it was not built into the institution from the beginning. Crucially, the IAEA emerged—partly in response to the "Atoms for Peace" initiative—in order to facilitate the circulation of nuclear things.11 The South Africans certainly lost no time exploring [End Page 5] commercial possibilities. When he wasn't occupied with agency politics, their delegate used the personal contacts he'd made at the IAEA to deepen relationships with potential uranium customers. In 1959, for example, he escorted two representatives of the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) all over Western Europe. This "sales survey team" sought to forecast supply and demand for the upcoming decade, guess at the probable price structure of commercial contracts, and assess how safeguards might constrain the sale of uranium.12 The tour proved so fruitful that the AEB's sales committee repeated it regularly, building on their IAEA delegate's expanding network of contacts.13¶ South Africans were by no means alone in using the agency in this way. From its inception, the IAEA served as a forum for its members. They learned about competing technologies and materials. They made commercial contacts. They offered or applied for technical assistance—and when such exchanges materialized, they inevitably involved buying and selling. And yes, as part of all this, they discussed international rules for regulating the flow of atomic knowledge and things.¶ The problem with the trade in nuclear things was the exceptionalism of things nuclear. How to buy and sell technologies that carried such heavy moral baggage and destructive potential? "Safeguards" sounded like an attractive answer. But what exactly would they entail? The U.S. promoted a pledge system: purchasers should agree not to use nuclear technologies and materials toward military ends and accept international inspections verifying compliance. Most other nations selling nuclear systems paid lip service, at least, to such a scheme. Buyers, however, rejected the prospect of controls. India, in particular, argued that regulating access would perpetuate colonial inequalities and undermine national sovereignty.¶ Arguments on both ends obscured more mundane political and commercial issues. South Africa, for example, wanted to avoid mandatory controls on uranium end-use which might commercially disadvantage its product. It had concrete reasons for such fears: South Africans suspected that Israel had "broke[n] off negotiations for supplies of Rand concentrates" [End Page 6] in 1962 because it had "instead obtained the supplies [it] required from France, without [the] safeguard inspection requirements"14 that South Africans had initially agreed to in order to placate the U.S. and the UK. Within India, experts disagreed over whether to build an atomic bomb, but at the IAEA they wanted to keep their options open by minimizing international controls. The U.S., the UK, and the Soviet Union, meanwhile, refused to accept inspections on their soil. Western European designers of nuclear systems feared that inspections would open the door to commercial spying, accusing the U.S. and the UK of seeking competitive advantage. Western Europe should also receive inspection exemption and remain subject only to Euratom safeguards. "Third world" nations deemed such proposals straightforward moves by the North to dominate the global South.15¶ The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) expressed (but did not resolve) all of these tensions. Under the NPT, "nuclear weapons states" pledged not to transfer atomic weapons or explosive devices to "non-nuclear weapons states" and to make "good faith" efforts to reduce their atomic arsenals. Other signatories renounced atomic weapons and agreed to accept IAEA compliance measures. The treaty thus tried to permanently fix which states had nuclear weapons and which didn't. It also sought to establish the relationship between these by invoking another ontology of global order, that of human rights and "development." The NPT referred to "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to . . . nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," which in turn would be facilitated by international cooperation that would proceed "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."16¶ The NPT codified global nuclearity but left the IAEA to implement its vision. The agency launched a major "technical assistance" program aimed at developing nations. It also tried to design a safeguards system. This was difficult, and the agency's solution to the problem of which things were nuclear enough to require safeguards kept changing. Secure in its position on the board, South Africa pushed to exclude mines and ore-processing plants from official definitions so as to minimize external oversight of its [End Page 7] industry. The IAEA's 1968 safeguards document defined a "principal nuclear facility" as "a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material, irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant)."17 Uranium mines and mills were thus specifically excluded from the category of "principal nuclear facilities." The 1972 safeguards document further excluded uranium ore from the category of "source material," thereby exempting its production from the ritual of inspections.18¶ By offering mechanisms to balance the spread and containment of nuclear things, inspections (and safeguards) themselves served to define nuclearity. For the NPT had never been specific on this point. How would exporters know what they could sell? In 1971, a committee formed to draft a list of things nuclear enough to trigger safeguards.19 Published in 1974, the first trigger list included reactors, fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants, and isotope separation plant equipment. Still, not all "nuclear exporters" agreed with its specifications. Competing lists developed.20 They grew longer and more detailed.21 Much remained unresolved or under-specified. Did uranium ore count as "source material" or not? It depended on the IAEA document. Did yellowcake count as "natural uranium" for export purposes? Also unclear. In any case, safeguards on uranium sales, when they existed, consisted merely of lines in a contract, paper promises that the buyer wouldn't use the ore for military ends. In and of themselves, uranium ore and yellowcake did not trigger inspections.22¶ The safeguards/inspections regime didn't simply aim to preserve the global nuclear weapons order. The regime's fine-grained distinctions about nuclearity also served as a technopolitical frame for global trade. At the most basic level, it did this by ontologically separating things which could safely be bought and sold from things which could not. Limiting safeguards on uranium sales to lines in a contract represented an accommodation between the exceptionalism of nuclearity and the banality of commerce. This [End Page 8] accommodation, in turn, laid down the technopolitical conditions in which "the uranium market" could exist as both concept and object. In the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. and the UK had strongly resisted the notion of a "market value" for uranium.23 Invoking the specter of Soviet supremacy (and knowing full well that they were the only large-scale buyers at that stage), they'd strong-armed suppliers into cost-plus pricing arrangements and kept contract terms secret. Cold war ideology had thus placed uranium beyond "the market."24 Only after safeguards on uranium ore became defined as end-use pledges written into sales contracts did the "uranium market" emerge as an object and practice of political economy. A critical component of this process, freedom from direct inspections meant that the production of commercial-grade yellowcake could proceed under the mundane conditions that obtained for any other commodity. Producers paid penalties if the chemical and metallurgical content of their yellowcake didn't meet the specs laid down by conversion plants, but no one followed the ore from its site of production to its final destination.¶ These accommodations held sway until the mid-1990s. Until then, inspections consisted of verifying declarations states made concerning their own "nuclear material and activities." Revelations that inspections had missed secret Iraqi and North Korean weapons programs, however, pushed the IAEA to expand its purview. The resulting "Additional Protocol" (1997) specified a set of technopolitical practices intended to increase the agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. For the first time, uranium mines and mills would be included in inspection rituals.25 Adoption of the "Additional Protocol" remained voluntary. If a state signed on, however, the resulting inspections promised a definitive verdict on weapons programs. States would subject themselves to more intrusive inspections precisely to achieve this apparent finality. Each inspection that exonerated a nation of evil intentions would contribute to global security—and market stability.26

#### Exceptionalism leads to extinction- produces a denial of death that demands constant causalities

Peterson ‘7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 3-8)

While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, 1 do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet dying is something that I do every day. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise." Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis." Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties" for instance, Bauman remarks that "the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed" by securing the "immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).8 The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus dialectically conditioned by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead - both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making racial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its "others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."? For Patterson, slavery - across its various historical forms - emerges as a substitute for death a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, "for a people who made much of their 'newness' - their potential, freedom, and innocence - it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is." For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning ... without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's in-famous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field."!' From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side" so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls" spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations- noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife - would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, "for cultures that fear death ... necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror:' (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims 'to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinscrib[ing] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a self-contained, sell-present entity. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body" does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether - as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."11Drawing from the activist slogan "silence = death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, this imperative to "raise the dead" reverses rather than displaces the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude. That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains implicated in the larger cultural disavowal of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism remains invested - despite all claims to the contrary - in an American exceptionalist project. American exceptionalism names, in part, a fetishization of novelty and futurity that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes eternally present while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

#### The alternative is to reject the Affirmative-Questioning American exceptionalism is key to understanding our place in the world- rejection is key to more productive politics

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.¶ The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities -- from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom -- the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.¶ This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.¶ What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

## off

#### Natural Gas industry is strong

Smith 2012 [Rebecca Smith Wall Street Journal 3-15-2012 “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html]

Across the country, utilities are turning to natural gas to generate electricity, with 258 plants expected to be built from 2011 through 2015, federal statistics indicate. Not only are gas-fired plants faster to build than reactors, they are much less expensive. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says it costs about $978 per kilowatt of capacity to build and fuel a big gas-fired power plant, compared with $5,339 per kilowatt for a nuclear plant.¶ Already, the inexpensive natural gas is putting downward pressure on electricity costs for consumers and businesses.¶ The EIA has forecast that the nation will add 222 gigawatts of generating capacity between 2010 and 2035—equivalent to one-fifth of the current U.S. capacity. The biggest chunk of that addition—58%—will be fired by natural gas, it said, followed by renewable sources, including hydropower, at 31%, then coal at 8% and nuclear power at 4%.

#### Plan reverses trend of expanded natural gas

Smith 2012 [Rebecca Smith Wall Street Journal 3-15-2012 “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html]

The U.S. nuclear industry seemed to be staging a comeback several years ago, with 15 power companies proposing as many as 29 new reactors. Today, only two projects are moving off the drawing board.¶ What killed the revival wasn't last year's nuclear accident in Japan, nor was it a soft economy that dented demand for electricity. Rather, a shale-gas boom flooded the U.S. market with cheap natural gas, offering utilities a cheaper, less risky alternative to nuclear technology.

#### US Natural gas key to check Russian expansionism

**Medlock et al 2011** (Kenneth B. Medlock III, Ph.D., Amy Myers Jaffe, Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D., July 2011, “Shale Gas and US National Security,” James A. Baker Institute, online)

Natural gas—if not disadvantaged by government policies that protect competing fuels, such as coal—stands to play a very important role in the U.S. energy mix for decades to come. Rising shale gas production has already delivered large beneficial impacts to the United States. Shale gas resources are generally located in close proximity to end-use markets where natural gas is utilized to fuel industry, generate electricity and heat homes. This offers both security of supply and economic benefits. Rising shale gas supplies have significantly reduced U.S. requirements for imported liquefied natural gas (LNG), which has already had geopolitical implications. For example, it has played a key role in weakening Russia’s ability to wield an “energy weapon” over its European customers by increasing alternative supplies to Europe in the form of LNG displaced from the U.S. market. Rising shale gas supply has also led to lower domestic natural gas prices, which lowers the costs of initiatives to diversify the American automobile fleet to run on non-oil based fuels such as electricity and compressed natural gas. In both the U.S. and abroad, the promise of growing shale gas production has raised the prospects for greater use of natural gas, an outcome with significant implications for global environmental objectives since lower-cost natural gas can displace fuels associated with higher air pollution and greater carbon intensity, such as coal and oil. Without doubt, the natural gas supply picture in North America has changed substantially, and it has had a ripple effect around the globe not only through displacement of supplies in global trade but also by fostering a growing interest in shale resource potential in other parts of the world. Thus, North American shale gas developments are having effects far beyond the North American market, and these impacts are likely to expand over time. Prior to the innovations leading to the recent increases in shale gas production, huge declines were expected in domestic production in the United States, Canada, and the North Sea. This meant an increasing reliance on foreign supplies at a time when natural gas was becoming more important as a source of energy. Shale gas developments stand to exert enormous influence on the structure of the global gas market. Throughout the 1990s, natural gas producers in the Middle East and Africa, anticipating rising demand for LNG from the United States in particular, began investing heavily in expanding LNG export capability, concomitant with investments in regasification being made in the United States. But the rapid growth in shale gas production has since turned such expectations upside down and rendered many of those investments obsolete. Import terminals for LNG are now scarcely utilized, and the prospects that the United States will become highly dependent on LNG imports in the coming years are receding, with some proposals now emerging for exports of LNG from North America. Rising shale gas production in the United States is already impacting markets abroad. In particular, LNG supplies whose development was anchored to the belief that the United States would be a premium market are now being diverted to European and Asian buyers. Not only has this immediately presented consumers in Europe with an alternative to Russian pipeline supplies, it is also exerting pressure on the status quo of indexing gas sales to a premium marker determined by the price of petroleum products. In fact, Russia has already had to accept lower prices for its natural gas and is now allowing a portion of its sales in Europe to be indexed to spot natural gas markets, or regional market hubs, rather than oil prices. This change in pricing terms signals a major paradigm shift. The recent developments around shale in the United States are also having another, potentially market structure altering, effect. Revelations about the existence of technically—and possibly commercially—viable shale gas resources are also occurring in other regions around the world, with shale gas potential being discussed in Europe, China, India, Australia, and elsewhere. To be sure, the enormity of global shale gas potential will have significant geopolitical ramifications and exert a powerful influence on U.S. energy and foreign policy. The state of knowledge regarding the amount of shale gas that is economically recoverable has changed rapidly over the last 10 years. A simple chronology is as follows: • As recently as 2003, the National Petroleum Council2 estimated that about 38 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of technically recoverable resources were spread across multiple basins in the North America. • In 2005, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) was using an estimate of 140 tcf in its Annual Energy Outlook as a mean for North American technically recoverable shale gas resources. • In 2008, Navigant Consulting, Inc.3 estimated a range of between 380 tcf and 900 tcf of technically recoverable resources, putting the mean at about 640 tcf. • In 2009, the Potential Gas Committee4 put its mean estimate at just over 680 tcf. • In 2011, Advanced Resources International (ARI) reported an estimate of about 1,930 tcf for North America, with over 860 tcf in U.S. gas shales alone.5 Note that although each assessment listed above is from an independent source, the estimates are increasing over time as more drilling occurs and technological advances are made, which is an indication of the learning-by-doing that is still occurring in this important play. Moreover, the shift in the generally accepted assessment of recoverable shale resources has left producers, consumers, and governments all grappling with the implications for markets and geopolitics. Utilizing scenario analysis based on peer-reviewed, scientific assessments of the properties of shales (which the Baker Institute then uses to develop its own technically recoverable estimates and associated finding and development cost curves), this Baker Institute study, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, is able to demonstrate that U.S. shale gas can help abate the enhancement of geopolitical power wielded by key petro-states as global primary energy use shifts increasingly to natural gas. Specifically, shale gas will play a critical role in diminishing the petro-power of major natural gas producers in the Middle East, Russia, and Venezuela and will be a major factor limiting global dependence on natural gas supplies from the same unstable regions that are currently uncertain sources of the global supply of oil. In this way, shale gas can play a critical role in averting a reinforcement of the political risk we currently face in the global oil market. The geopolitical repercussions of expanding shale gas production include the following: • Virtually eliminates U.S. requirements for imported LNG for at least two decades • Reduces competition for LNG supplies from the Middle East, thereby moderating prices and spurring greater use of natural gas, an outcome with significant implications for global environmental objectives • Combats the long-term potential monopoly power of a “gas OPEC” or a single producer such as Russia to exercise dominance over large natural gas consumers in Europe or elsewhere • Reduces Russia’s market share in non-FSU Europe from 27 percent in 2009 to about 13 percent by 2040, reducing the chances that Moscow can use energy as a tool for political gain • Reduces the future share of world gas supply from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela; without shale discoveries, these nations would have accounted for about 33 percent of global gas supply in 2040, but with shale, this is reduced to 26 percent • Reduces the opportunity for Venezuela to become a major LNG exporter and thereby lowers longer-term dependence in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe on Venezuelan LNG • Reduces U.S. and Chinese dependence on Middle East natural gas supplies, lowering the incentives for geopolitical and commercial competition between the two largest consuming countries and providing both countries with new opportunities to diversify their energy supply • Reduces Iran’s ability to tap energy diplomacy as a means to strengthen its regional power or to buttress its nuclear aspirations.

#### Expansionism causes global nuclear war

**Blank 2009** (Stephen Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, March 2009, “Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,” online)

Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of retaliation. 168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for exclusive hegemony in their own “sphere of influence” and use nuclear instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker “peripheral” states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory or respite they need. 169 Simultaneously, The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives. Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russia’s case, to achieve “intra-war escalation control”—author 170 ) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances 7 in military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental wars involving WMD. 171 Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national “egotism” will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms of world order, such as the special responsibility of the “great powers” in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations, undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of aggression on their neighbors or their own people.

## China

#### China won’t surpass the U.S.--empirics and institutions

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We have a historical precedent for this type of growth and how it runs out of steam: the Soviet Union. After the Bolsheviks took over the highly inefficient agricultural economy from the Tsarist regime and started to use the power of the state to move people and resources into industry, the Soviet Union grew at then-unparalleled rates, achieving an average annual growth rate of over 6 percent between 1928 and 1960. Though there was much enthusiasm about Soviet growth – as there is now about China’s growth machine – it couldn’t and didn’t last. By the 1970s, the Soviets had produced almost all the growth that could be derived from moving people from agriculture into industry, and despite various incentives and bonuses, and even harsh punishments for failure, they could not generate innovation. The Soviet economy stagnated and then totally collapsed. OPINION: 8 reasons America is not in decline China has more potential than the Soviet Union. Its growth has not come simply by government fiat, but also because it has reformed its economic institutions, providing incentives to farmers and some firms (though having government connections still helps enormously, and challenging powerful firms can land you in jail or worse). China also had more technological catching up to do than the Soviet Union. But this potential will come to an end as well unless China radically transforms its institutions. This requires not only obvious steps such as introducing an independent judiciary, independent media, and more secure property rights for businesses, but truly inclusive political institutions. This necessitates a fundamental political opening so that political power is more equally distributed and can underpin economic institutions. This, in turn, will create a level playing field and encourage and fully reward all sorts of innovation – especially the disruptive kind.

#### Containment of China is ineffective- causes hardliner consolidation

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Each of the two main strategic alternatives to restraint, primacy and global engagement, suffers from major flaws. Primacists seek to contain peer-competitors to America, especially China. They hope to dissuade Beijing from building a military to match its growing economic power. Some even want to destabilize the Beijing government by accelerating China’s liberalization in ways that would make modernization difficult to control, or by trying to embarrass the government (militarily or otherwise) in a way that would cause decades of political and economic disarray. Such an anti-China strategy is unwise. First, it is far from guaranteed that China will continue its economic rise or successfully manage the social strains that its government already faces. And a policy of active containment (let alone a policy of destabilization) may even make it easy for leaders in Beijing to rally nationalist sentiment against the United States and distract attention from their own failings. This sort of anti-China strategy accomplishes only one thing for sure: it turns tomorrow’s potential adversary into today’s certain one.

#### Deterrence prevents India/Pakistan conflict

Tepperman 2009 (Jonathan Tepperman, Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine and former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2009, Newsweek, September 14, 2009, Lexis Academic)

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

## Nuclear Deterrence

#### Nuclear displaces more jobs than it produces—coal and renewables

William Tucker is the author of Terrestrial Energy : How Nuclear Power Will Lead the Green Revolution and End America's Energy Odyssey, energy journalist, “Nuclear's Dilemma: Few Jobs, Just Energy,” American Spectator, August 24, 2012, http://spectator.org/archives/2012/08/24/nuclears-dilemma-few-jobs-just, accessed 9-2-2012.

So the great Presidential battle over the future of energy is shaping up -- which can create more jobs, coal or wind? What about nuclear, which might also be said to have a potential role in the nation's energy future? Well, nuclear energy has one great weakness. It doesn't create many jobs. All it creates is lots of energy. And in the contest for which form of energy can employ the most people, that doesn't seem to count for much at all. Let it be said first that the other players missing in action here are gas and oil. New drilling techniques for shale gas and tight oil are now creating more jobs and useful energy than all the other technologies combined. Production from the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and Ohio is up 82 percent over last year. North Dakota's Bakken shale has created the lowest unemployment rate in the nation. Oklahoma gas fields are complaining they can't find enough workers. Any healthy, working-age male could head for any of these states and find themselves making close to a six-figure income. But all this is happening in the private sector so it doesn't draw much attention in presidential campaigns. Most of the Marcellus shale lies under private lands so -- blessedly -- it can be done without federal interference. Only New York State has stopped the show -- which is just another reason why upstate New York, if separated from New York City, ranks as the second-poorest state in the nation behind only Mississippi. What attracts politicians to coal and wind is that they involve the federal government. The EPA is on a campaign to close down 10 percent of the nation's coal plants and so Romney can win votes by promising to intervene. The President, on the other hand, continues his efforts to "harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories," as he put it in his Inaugural Address. Wind's production tax credit -- which makes it profitable to erect windmills even if they never produce a kilowatt of electricity -- will be extended into the foreseeable future. Corn ethanol, which now consumes 40 percent of the corn crop, will continue to be mandated, even though it is driving up world food prices and international officials are accusing us of starving the world's poor. (The EPA showed its defiance last week by announcing that sorghum, the nation's third largest crop, will also be converted into ethanol.) The military is being instructed to substitute biofuels for jet fuel, even though it will cost $59 a gallon. And with nearly half the land west of the Mississippi still owned by the federal government, the President is able to commission a 350-square-mile wind farm in Wyoming and several 20-square-mile solar plants in the Mojave Desert. All this will create jobs, jobs, jobs. So how does nuclear stack up against all this? Not very well. Take the matter of coal mining. There are an estimated 88,000 coal miners in this country working 1,300 coal mines, most of them in Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and Kentucky. There are 400 mines in Kentucky alone. More than half a dozen states identify themselves as "coal states," with Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, Alabama, Colorado, and Wyoming filling out the list. Montana, the state with the biggest coal reserves, hasn't really started developing them yet. To this must be added the jobs in the railroad industry. A 1,000-megawatt (MW) coal plant must be replenished by a 110-car coal train arriving at the plant every 30 hours. A fully loaded coal "unit" train now leaves the Powder River Basin in Wyoming every eight minutes. Coal constitutes almost half the freight aboard the railroads and it is a moot question as to whether the railroads really own the coal companies or the coal companies own the railroads. In any case, there are close to 200,000 railroad workers in the U.S., half of them dedicated to moving coal. Now compare this to the mining and transport needed to fuel a nuclear reactor. Because uranium has an energy density almost 3 million times that of coal, not much is required. The Uranium Producers Association reports there are 13 operating uranium mines in the country, employing 1,360 workers. The annual output of uranium mining would fill two railroad cars so no railroad traffic either. Actually, domestic uranium production has been depressed over the last two decades because of the Megatons-to-Megawatts program that has recycled 18,000 former Soviet warheads in the greatest swords-into-plowshares effort in history. (Never heard of it? I wonder why.) But the treaty ends in 2014 and domestic uranium production may increase a little. The Russians are now proposing to supply the entire world with uranium out of one mine in Siberia.

#### tech leadership high—aff dents it

Rob Preston, VP & Editor in Chief, InformationWeek, “U.S. Tech Leadership On Solid Ground, IT Pros Say,” Information Week, July 9, 2012, http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/us-tech-leadership-on-solid-ground-it-pr/240002852, accessed 9-3-2012.

Two years ago, under the moniker Innovation Mandate, InformationWeek fielded a survey and conducted scores of interviews to gauge whether U.S. IT pros and the industry at large think this country is declining as a global technology leader--and if so, what we can do about it. When asked to describe where the U.S. stands in the global IT industry, 63% of the 624 business technology pros who responded to that 2010 survey characterized the U.S. as "a strong player, but losing its lead on a global scale," while 5% saw the U.S. as "a former leader whose best days are behind it." Only 32% of respondents still saw the U.S. IT industry as "a global leader positioned to grow its influence." How have views changed in two years? We fielded an updated survey in April (download our full, updated Innovation Mandate report), and the results are in: IT pros are slightly more optimistic about the state of U.S. technology leadership, though their opinions about the most pressing priorities and competitive threats, as well as which IT vendors and nations are taking the mantle of leadership and which are falling behind, have shifted a bit in two years. Responding to our latest survey were 552 business technology pros at a range of U.S. companies, educational institutions, and government organizations. The same percentage as in 2010--63%--think the U.S. is a strong IT player but losing its global lead. The percentage who are more optimistic--who think it's a global leader positioned to grow its influence--rose slightly, to 34% from 32%. Only 3% of respondents think the U.S. is a former IT leader, compared with 5% two years ago. What, Me Worry? As for the main factors preventing the U.S. from growing as a global IT leader, the results of the recent survey are pretty consistent with those from 2010. Still topping the list of concerns is "shortsighted decisions that are shipping tech jobs and ultimately innovation abroad," selected as one of the most important three factors by 67% of the 362 survey respondents who think the U.S. is a former technology leader or is losing its lead, compared with 66% two years ago. Likewise, the No. 2 and No. 3 factors thought to be limiting U.S. technology leadership are the same in the 2012 survey as in 2010: "failure of the educational system to produce workers who excel in STEM" and "lack of leadership at the federal policy-making level" (see chart below). The biggest shifts since 2010 have to do with intellectual property and perceptions about U.S. IT worker productivity and ambition. In the 2010 survey, only 18% of respondents cited "failure to protect intellectual property developed in the U.S." as one of the top three factors holding back the U.S. IT industry. But that percentage jumped to 28% this year, as more technology R&D and design work gets farmed out to companies in other countries, or as news surfaces that foreign companies and governments are trying to steal that U.S. IP. Meantime, 21% of the IT pros we surveyed in 2010 worried about "a corporate culture where tech workers no longer are 'hungry' enough to out-innovate counterparts based abroad," but only 15% see that as a top concern today. Responses to our question about what the U.S. government's role should be in supporting IT innovation show attitudes shifting subtly away from such reliance. (Multiple responses were allowed.) About the same percentage of respondents to our 2012 and 2010 surveys think the government's role should be to support basic and applied research at the university level (59% vs. 60%) and federal level (58% in both surveys). But the percentage of respondents who want the government to provide R&D tax credits to private industry declined, to 54% from 63%. Also declining is the percentage of respondents who want the government to fund big technology programs such as broadband, smart grid, and electronic medical records (38% in 2012 versus 45% in 2010). Where IT pros want more government involvement (or, more accurately, don't want less) is in regulation: 51% of respondents called for less IT regulation two years ago compared with 46% this year.

## Econ

#### Employment is picking up- not from discouraged workers

Fletcher and Irwin 10-5 [Michael A. Fletcher and Neil Irwin 10-5-2012 Washington Post “Unemployment rate falls to 7.8% in September” http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-plunges-to-78percent/2012/10/05/bdb6e5bc-0ee7-11e2-a310-2363842b7057\_story.html]

The job market is finally showing some juice.¶ The unemployment rate fell to 7.8 percent in September, the Labor Department said Friday, from 8.1 percent in July, its lowest since January 2009. It is a surprising show of improvement in a job market that had seemed listless in recent months. Unlike in August, the number improved for the right reason: not because people gave up looking for jobs, but because far more people reported having one.¶ Employers reported creating 114,000 jobs in September, almost identical to analysts’ forecasts, but revisions to data from July and August brought boosted that measure of the job market, as well.¶ Add it up, and what had seemed to be a summer lull in employment increasingly appears not to have been much of a lull at all.

#### Threshold is far past 2008-10 levels on which your authors base their analyses—must demonstrate presence of numerous crucial factors

-high prevalence of exotic foreign holdings, credit default swapping, affiliate lending, investor fire-selling

Rose and Spiegel 8 (CROSS-COUNTRY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2008 CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES AND AMERICAN; Andrew K. Rose, prof econ analysis University of California, Mark M. Spiegel, vice president international research, FRB San Francisco; Pacific Economic Review, p. 340-363, ebsco)

Exposure to contagion through this ﬁnancial channel might have been exacerbated in the 2008 crisis because of the prevalence of holdings of exotic ﬁnancial instruments; these were particularly vulnerable to capital losses in the wake of a general downturn. For instance, when the market price of United States asset backed securities fell, European banks holding that paper, as well as related conduits and structured investment vehicles, experienced losses. These losses then spread to the asset-backed commercial paper market, as the institutions holding these money-losing instruments then turned to that market for funds, initiating a decline in liquidity in that market as well (see Davis, 2008). Coudert and Gex (2008) argue that credit default swap market activity is also prone to contagion, noting that that market had seen a large rise in correlations of asset prices since August 2007. This induces investors to respond to bad news about an individual asset or market with more concern about counterparty risk of related and seemingly unrelated assets. In a similar vein, Gros and Micossi (2008) note that many European banks found themselves exposed to foreign countries as a result of the activities of their afﬁliates in those countries. Although their balance sheets were formally separate, these banks centralized their asset and liability management, ensuring that subsidiary ﬁnancial difﬁculties would ﬁnd their way to home country lending policies. Vulnerability to adverse external shocks might be exacerbated due to poor balance sheet positions. For example, Davis (2008) argues that leveraged investors increase the risk of market contagion, as they might be forced to sell in illiquid situations, feeding a ‘ﬁre-sale’ dynamic that forces prices down further and results in the need for even more selling. Adrian and Shin (2008) argue that mark-to-market practices exacerbate the severity of the impact of changes in prices and perceived risks on market liquidity. As measures of direct ﬁnancial exposure, Forbes and Chinn (2004) use the ratios of total bank lending and foreign direct investment to a given country as shares of GDP. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) use bilateral stocks of assets and liabilities for foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, debt and loans, again expressed as shares of GDP.

### Cap– Neg Block

#### Demand for supposedly objective fact over theory replicates existing framing biases and leads to flawed action.

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, 2002, “I Am a Fighting Atheist,” Bad Subjects, http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2002/59/zizek.html

Zizek: Martin Heidegger said that philosophy doesn't make things easier, it makes them harder and more complicated. What they can learn is the ambiguity of so many situations, in the sense that whenever we are presented by the big media with a simple opposition, like multicultural tolerance vs. ethnic fundamentalism, the opposition is never so clear-cut. The idea is that things are always more complex. For example, multiculturalist tolerance, or at least a certain type of it, generates or involves a much deeper racism.] As a rule, this type of tolerance relies on the distinction between us multiculturalists, and intolerant ethnic others, with the paradoxical result that anti-racism itself is used to dismiss IN A RACIST WAY the other as a racist. Not to mention the fact that this kind of "tolerance" is as a rule patronizing. Its respect for the other cannot but remind us of the respect for naive children's beliefs: we leave them in their blessed ignorance so as not to hurt them... Or take Chomsky. There are two problematic features in his work — though it goes without saying that I admire him very much. One is his anti-theorism. A friend who had lunch with him recently told me that Chomsky announced that he'd concluded that social theory and economic theory are of no use — that things are simply evident, like American state terror, and that all we need to know are the facts. I disagree with this. And the second point is that with all his criticism of the U.S., Chomsky retains a certain commitment to what is the most elemental ingredient of American ideology, individualism, a fundamental belief that America is the land of free individuals, and so on. So in that way he is deeply and problematically American. You can see some of these problems in the famous Faurisson scandal in France. As many readers may know, Chomsky wrote the preface for a book by Robert Faurisson, which was threatened with being banned because it denied the reality of the Holocaust. Chomsky claimed that though he opposes the book's content, the book should still be published for free speech reasons. I can see the argument, but I can't support him here. The argument is that freedom of the press is freedom for all, even for those whom we find disgusting and totally unacceptable; otherwise, today it is them, tomorrow it is us. It sounds logical, but I think that it avoids the true paradox of freedom: that some limitations have to guarantee it. So[ to understand what goes on today — to understand how we experience ourselves, to understand the structures of social authority, to understand whether we really live in a "permissive" society, and how prohibitions function today — for these we need social theory. That's the difference between me and the names you mentioned BS: Chomsky and people like him seem to think that if we just got the facts out there, things would almost take care of themselves. Why is this wrong? Why aren't "the facts" enough? Zizek: Let me give you a very naive answer. I think that basically the facts are already known. Let's take Chomsky's analyses of how the CIA intervened in Nicaragua. OK, (he provides) a lot of details, yes, but did I learn anything fundamentally new? It's exactly what I'd expected: the CIA was playing a very dirty game. Of course it's more convincing if you learn the dirty details. But I don't think that we really learned anything dramatically new there. I don't think that merely "knowing the facts" can really change people's perceptions. To put it another way: Chomsky's own position on Kosovo, on the Yugoslav war, shows some of his limitations, because of a lack of a proper historical context. With all his facts, he got the picture wrong. As far as I can judge, Chomsky bought a certain narrative — that we shouldn't put all the blame on Milosevic, that all parties were more or less to blame, and the West supported or incited this explosion because of its own geopolitical goals. All are not the same. I'm not saying that the Serbs are guilty. I just repeat my old point that Yugoslavia was not over with the secession of Slovenia. It was over the moment Milosevic took over Serbia. This triggered a totally different dynamic. It is also not true that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was supported by the West. On the contrary, the West exerted enormous pressure, at least until 1991, for ethnic groups to remain in Yugoslavia. I saw [former Secretary of State] James Baker on Yugoslav TV supporting the Yugoslav army's attempts to prevent Slovenia's secession. The ultimate paradox for me is that because he lacks a theoretical framework, Chomsky even gets the facts wrong sometimes.

#### 4. Capitalism is destroys agency

Wright 6 (Eric, professor of sociology at UW-Madison, Envisioning Real Utopias, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Taking%20the%20social.pdf)

This market and property based freedom of choice is not an illusion, but it is not a complete account of the relationship of individual freedom and autonomy to capitalism. There are two reasons why capitalism significantly obstructs, rather than fully realizes, this ideal. First, the relations of domination within capitalist workplaces constitute pervasive restrictions on individual autonomy and self-direction. At the core of the institution of private property is the power of owners to decide how their property is to be used. In the context of capitalist firms this is the basis for conferring authority on owners to direct the actions of their employees. An essential part of the employment contract is the agreement of employees to follow orders, to do what they are told. This may, of course, still allow for some degree of self-direction within work, both because as a practical matter employers may be unable to effectively monitor the details of employee behavior, and because in some labor processes the employer may grant the employee considerable autonomy. Nevertheless, in most capitalist workplaces for most workers, individual freedom and self-direction are quite curtailed. This lack of autonomy and freedom within the world of work is an important part of what has been called “alienation” in the critique of capitalism. The second way in which capitalism undermines the ideal of individual freedom and autonomy centers on the massive inequalities of wealth and income which capitalism generates. Such inequality implies, as Philippe van Parijs has argued, that there is a significant inequality in “real freedom” across persons. “Real Freedom” consists in the effective capacity of people to act on their life plans, to be in a position to actually make the choices which matter to them. 7 Large inequalities of wealth and income mean some people have a much greater freedom in this sense than others. While it is certainly true that relative to previous forms of society capitalism enhances individual autonomy and freedom, it also erects barriers to the full realization of this value.

#### In China this will produce manifold social conflict through fundamentalist unrest, and positions us in such a way that we rely on outdated “politics of fear” to be analyzed by cultural studies while the capitalist march silently continues.

Slavoj Zizek, researcher in sociology at the university of Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject: The absent centre of political ontology, 1999, pg. 353-359

The big news of today’s post-political age of the ‘end of ideology’ is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to respon¬sible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom, the subordination of the process of production to social control — the radical repoliticization of the economy. That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality: because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations is the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities...), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple ad hoc coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something — what really matters — will not be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized.35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodi¬ments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom — that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature — today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life. The irony of history is that, in the Eastern European ex-Communist countries, the ‘reformed’ Communists were the first to learn this lesson. Why did many of them return to power via free elections in the mid 1990s? This very return offers the ultimate proof that these states have in fact entered capitalism. That is to say: what do ex-Communists stand for today? Due to their privileged links with the newly emerging capitalists (mostly members of the old nomenklatura ‘privatizing’ the companies they once ran), they are first and foremost the party of big Capital; further¬more, to erase the traces of their brief but none the less rather traumatic experience with politically active civil society, they as a rule ferociously advocate a quick deideologization, a retreat from active civil society engagement into passive, apolitical consumerism — the very two features which characterize contemporary capitalism. So dissidents are astonished to discover that they played the role of ‘vanishing mediators’ on the way from socialism to capitalism, in which the same class as before rules under a new guise. It is therefore wrong to claim that the ex-Communists’ return to power shows how people are disappointed by capitalism and long for the old socialist security — in a kind of Hegelian ‘negation of negation’, it is only with the ex-Communists’ return to power that socialism was effectively negated — that is to say, what the political analysts (mis)perceive as ‘disappointment with capitalism’ is in fact disappointment with the ethico-political enthusiasm for which there is no place in ‘normal’ capital¬ism.36 We should thus reassert the old Marxist critique of ‘reification’: today, emphasizing the depoliticized ‘objective’ economic logic against allegedly ‘outdated’ forms of ideological passions is the predominant ideological form, since ideology is always self-referential, that is, it always defines itself through a distance towards an Other dismissed and denounced as ‘ideological’.~~ For that precise reason — because the depolit¬icized economy is the disavowed fundamental fantasy’ of postmodern politics — a properly political act would necessarily entail the repoliticization of the economy: within a given situation, a gesture counts as an act only in so far as it disturbs (‘traverses’) its fundamental fantasy. In so far as today’s moderate Left, from Blair to Clinton, fully accepts this depoliticization, we are witnessing a strange reversal of roles: the only serious political force which continues to question the unrestrained rule of the market is the populist extreme Right (Buchanan in the USA; Le Pen in France). ‘When Wall Street reacted negatively to a fall in the unemployment rate, the only one to make the obvious point that what is good for Capital is obviously not what is good for the majority of the population was Buchanan. In contrast to the old wisdom according to which the extreme Right openly says what the moderate Right secretly thinks, but doesn’t dare say in public (the open assertion of racism, of the need for strong authority and the cultural hegemony of ‘Western values’, etc.), we are therefore approaching a situation in which the extreme Right openly says what the moderate Left secretly thinks, but doesn’t dare say in public (the necessity to curb the freedom of Capital). One should also not forget that today’s rightist survivalist militias often look like a caricaturized version of the extreme militant leftist splinter groups of the l960s: in both cases we are dealing with radical anti-institutional logic — that is, the ultimate enemy is the repressive State apparatus (the FBI, the Army, the judicial system) which threatens the group’s very survival, and the group is organized as a tight disciplined body in order to be able to withstand this pressure. The exact counter¬point to this is a Leftist like Pierre Bourdieu, who defends the idea of a unified Europe as a strong ‘social state’, guaranteeing the minimum of social rights and welfare against the onslaught of globalization: it is difficult to abstain from irony when one sees a radical Leftist raising barriers against the corrosive global power of Capital, so fervently cel¬ebrated by Marx. So, again, it is as if the roles are reversed today: Leftists support a strong State as the last guarantee of social and civil liberties against Capital; while Rightists demonize the State and its apparatuses as the ultimate terrorist machine. Of course, one should fully acknowledge the tremendous liberating impact of the postmodern politicization of domains which were hitherto considered apolitical (feminism, gay and lesbian politics, ecology, ethnic and other so-called minority issues): the fact that these issues not only became perceived as inherently political but also gave birth to new forms of political subjectivization thoroughly reshaped our entire political and cultural landscape. So the point is not to play down this tremendous advance in favour of the return to some new version of so-called economic essentialism; the point is, rather, that the depoliticization of the economy generates the populist New Right with its Moral Majority ideology, which today is the main obstacle to the realization of the very (feminist, ecological...) demands on which postmodern forms of political subjectiv¬ization focus. In short, I am pleading for a ‘return to the primacy of the economy’ not to the detriment of the issues raised by postmodern forms of politicization, but precisely in order to create the conditions for the more effective realization of feminist, ecological, and so on, demands. A further indicator of the necessity for some kind of politicization of the economy is the overtly ‘irrational’ prospect of concentrating quasi-monopolistic power in the hands of a single individual or corporation, like Rupert Murdoch or Bill Gates. If the next decade brings the unifica¬tion of the multitude of communicative media in a single apparatus reuniting the features of interactive computer, TV, video- and audio-phone, video and CD player, and if Microsoft actually succeeds in becom¬ing the quasi-monopolistic owner of this new universal medium, controlling not only the language used in it but also the conditions of its application, then we obviously approach the absurd situation in which a single agent, exempt from public control, will in effect dominate the basic communicational structure of our lives and will thus, in a way, be stronger than any government. This opens up the prospect of paranoiac scenarios: since the digital language we shall all use will none the less be man-made, constructed by programmers, is it not possible to imagine the corporation that owns it ins.talling in it some special secret program ingredient which will enable it to control us, or a virus which the corporation can trigger, and thus bring our communication to a halt? When biogenetic corpora¬tions assert their ownership of our genes through patenting them, they also give rise to a similar paradox of owning the innermost parts of our body, so that we are already owned by a corporation without even being aware of it. The prospect we are confronting is thus that both the communicational network we use and the genetic language we are made of will be owned and controlled by corporations (or even a corporation) out of public control. Again, does not the very absurdity of this prospect — the private control of the very public base of our communication and reproduction, the very network of our social being — impose a kind of socialization as the only solution? In other words, is not the impact of the so-called information revolution on capitalism the ultimate exemplification of the old Marxian thesis that ‘at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or — what is but a legal expression of the same thing — with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto’?3~ Do not the two phenomena we have mentioned (the unpre-dictable global consequences of decisions made by private companies; the patent absurdity of owning’ a person’s genome or the media individuals use for communication), to which one should add at least the antagonism contained in the notion of owning (scientific) knowledge (since knowledge is by nature neutral to its propagation, that is, it is not worn out by its spread and universal use), explain why today’s capitalism has to resort to more and more absurd strategies to sustain the economy of scarcity in the sphere of information, and thus to contain within the frame of private property and market relations the demon it has unleashed (say, by inventing ever new modes of preventing the free copying of digit-alized information)? In short, does not the prospect of the informational ‘global village’ signal the end of market relations (which are by definition, based on the logic of scarcity), at least in the sphere of digitalized information? After the demise of Socialism, the ultimate fear of Western capitalism is that another nation or ethnic group will beat the West on its own capitalist terms, combining the productivity of capitalism with a form of social mores foreign to us in the West: in the l970s, the object of fear and fascination was Japan; while now, after a short interlude of fascination with South¬East Asia, attention is focusing more and more on China as the next superpower, combining capitalism with the Communist political structure. Such fears ultimately give rise to purely phantasmic formations, like the image of China surpassing the West in productivity while retaining its authoritarian sociopolitical structure — one is tempted to designate this phantasmic combination the ‘Asiatic mode of capitalist production’. Against these fears, one should emphasize that China will, sooner or later, pay the price for the unbridled development of capitalism in new forms of social unrest and instability: the ‘winning formula’ of combining capitalism with the Asiatic ‘closed’ ethical community life-world is doomed to explode. Now, more than ever, one should reassert Marx’s old formula that the limit of capitalism is Capital itself: the danger to Western capitalism comes not from outside, from the Chinese or some other monster beating us at our own game while depriving us of Western liberal individualism, but from the inherent limit of its own process of colonizing ever new (not only geographic but also cultural, psychic, etc.) domains, of eroding the last resistant spheres of non-reflected substantial being, which has to end in some kind of implosion, when Capital will no longer have any substantial content outside itself to feed on.39 One should take Marx’s metaphor of Capital as a vampire-like entity literally: it needs some kind of pre-reflexive ‘natural productivity’ (talents in different domains of art, inventors in science, etc.) in order to feed on its own blood, and thus to reproduce itself — when the circle closes itself, when reflexivity becomes thoroughly universal, the whole system is threatened. Another sign which points in this direction is how, in the sphere of what Adorno and Horkheimer called Kulturindustrie, the desubstantializa¬tion and/or reflexivity of the production process has reached a level that threatens the whole system with global implosion. Even in high art, the recent fashion for exhibitions in which ‘everything is permitted’ and can pass as an art object, up to mutilated animal bodies, betrays this desperate need of cultural Capital to colonize and include in its circuit even the most extreme and pathological strata of human subjectivity. Paradoxically — and not without irony — the first musical trend which was in a way ‘fabricated’, exploited for a short time and very soon forgotten, since it lacked the musical substance to survive and attain the status of ‘classics’ like the early rock of the Beatles and Rolling Stones, was none other than punk, which simultaneously marked the strongest intrusion of violent working-class protest into mainstream pop culture — in a kind of mocking version of the Hegelian infinite judgement, in which opposites directly coincide, the raw energy of social protest coincided with the new level of commercial prefabrication which, as it were, creates the object it sells out of itself, with no need for some ‘natural talent’ to emerge and be subsequently exploited, like Baron Munchhausen saving himself from the swamp by pulling himself up by his own hairs. Do we not encounter the same logic in politics, where the point is less and less to follow a coherent global programme but, rather, to try to guess, by means of opinion polls, ‘what the people want’, and offer them that? Even in theory, doesn’t the same hold for cultural studies in the Anglo-Saxon domain, or for the very theory of the risk society?40 Theorists are less and less involved in substantial theoretical work, restraining themselves to writing short ‘interventions’ which mostly display their anxiety to follow the latest theoretical trends (in feminism, for example, perspicacious theorists soon realized that radical social constructionism —gender as pefformatively enacted, and so on — is out; that people are getting tired of it; so they start to rediscover psychoanalysis, the Uncon¬scious; in postcolonial studies, the latest trend is to oppose multicultural¬ism as a false solution .. .). The point is thus not simply that cultural studies or risk society theory is insufficient on account of its content: an inherent commodification is discernible in the very form of the social mode of functioning of what are supposed to be the latest forms of the American or European academic Left. This reflexivity, which is also a crucial part of the ‘second modernity,’ is what the theorists of the reflexive risk society tend to leave out of consideration.

### Competitiveness

#### Their notion of competitiveness is outdated and only and illusion in modern economics – competition now centralizes markets to quasi-monopolies that dominate the economy

Foster 11 Jeremy Foster, editor of Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “Monopoly and Competition in Twenty-First Century Capitalism”, Monthly Review, 2011, Volume 62, Issue 11 (April), http://monthlyreview.org/2011/04/01/monopoly-and-competition-in-twenty-first-century-capitalism

The ambiguity of competition evident in Friedman’s definitions of competition and monopoly illuminates the fact that today’s giant corporations are closer to the monopoly side of the equation. Most of the examples of competition and competitive strategy that dominate economic news are in fact rivalrous struggles between quasi-monopolies (or oligopolies) for greater monopoly power. Hence, to the extent to which we speak of competition today, it is more likely to be oligopolistic rivalry, i.e., battles between monopoly-capitalist firms. Or to underline the irony, the greater the amount of discussion of cutthroat competition in media and business circles and among politicians and pundits, the greater the level of monopoly power in the economy. What we are calling “the ambiguity of competition” was first raised as an issue in the 1920s by Joseph Schumpeter, who was concerned early on with the effect of the emergence of the giant, monopolistic corporation on his own theory of an economy driven by innovative entrepreneurs. The rise of big business in the developed capitalist economies in the early twentieth century led to a large number of attempts to explain the shift from competitive to what was variously called, trustified, concentrated, or monopoly capitalism. Marxist and radical theorists played the most prominent part in this, building on Marx’s analysis of the concentration and centralization of capital. The two thinkers who were to go the furthest in attempting to construct a distinct theory of monopoly-based capitalism in the early twentieth century were the radical American economist Thorstein Veblen in The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) and the Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding in his Finance Capital (1910). In his Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism Lenin depicted imperialism in its “briefest possible definition,” as “the monopoly stage of capitalism.”24 The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in the United States in 1890 in an attempt to control the rise of cartels and monopolies. No one at the time doubted that capitalism had entered a new phase of economic concentration, for better or for worse. In 1928 Schumpeter addressed these issues and the threat they represented to the whole theoretical framework of neoclassical economics in an article entitled “The Instability of Capitalism.” “The nineteenth century,” he argued, could be called “the time of competitive, and what has so far followed, the time of increasingly ‘trustified,’ or otherwise ‘organized,’ ‘regulated,’ or ‘managed,’ capitalism.” For Schumpeter, conditions of dual monopoly or “multiple monopoly” (the term “oligopoly” had not yet been introduced) were much “more important practically” than either perfect competition or the assumption of a single monopoly, and of more general importance “in a theoretic sense.” The notion of pure competition was, in fact, “very much in the nature of a crutch” for orthodox economics, and due to overreliance on it, the undermining of economic orthodoxy was “a rather serious one.” Trustified capitalism raised the ambiguity of competition directly: “Such things as bluffing, the use of non-economic force, a will to force the other party to their knees, have much more scope in the case of two-sided monopoly—just as cut-throat methods have in the case of limited competition—than in a state of perfect competition.”

#### Marxist dialectics prove competitiveness is impossible in a capitalist economy – the immediate effect is negated by emergence of dominant corporations that centralize the market

Foster 11 Jeremy Foster, editor of Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “Monopoly and Competition in Twenty-First Century Capitalism”, Monthly Review, 2011, Volume 62, Issue 11 (April), http://monthlyreview.org/2011/04/01/monopoly-and-competition-in-twenty-first-century-capitalism

The desirability of monopoly, from the perspective of a capitalist, is self-evident: it lowers risk and increases profits. No sane owner or business wishes more competition; the rational move is always to seek as much monopoly power as possible and carefully avoid the nightmare world of the powerless competitive firm of economics textbooks. Once a firm achieves economic concentration and monopoly power, it is maintained through barriers to entry that make it prohibitively costly and risky for would-be competitors successfully to invade an oligopolistic or monopolistic industry—though such barriers to entry remain relative rather than absolute. Creating and maintaining barriers to entry is essential work for any corporation. In his authoritative study, The Economics of Industrial Organization, William Shepherd provides a list of twenty-two different barriers to entry commonly used by firms to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power.5 Monopoly, in this sense, is the logical result of competition, and should be expected. It is in the DNA of capitalism. For Karl Marx, capital tended to grow ever larger in a single hand, partly as a result of a straightforward process of concentration of capital (accumulation proper), and even more as a result of the centralization of capital, or the absorption of one capital by another. In this struggle, he wrote, “the larger capitals,” as a rule, “beat the smaller…. Competition rages in direct proportion to the number, and in inverse proportion to the magnitude of the rival capitals. It always ends in the ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the hands of their competitors, and partly vanish completely. Apart from this, an altogether new force comes into existence with the development of capitalist production: the credit system.” Credit or finance, available more readily to large firms, becomes one of the two main levers, along with competition itself, in the centralization process. By means of mergers and acquisitions, the credit system can create huge, centralized agglomerations of capital in the “twinkling of an eye.” The results of both concentration and centralization are commonly referred to as economic concentration.6

### Economy

#### “Economic crisis” is an endless repetition of the logic of capital – it can only be a “crisis” if you first accept capitalism – rejecting the system in its entirety reveals the constructed nature of their impacts.

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, 1997, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism.”

So, back to the recent Labour victory, one can see how it not only involved a hegemonic reappropriation of a series of motifs which were usually inscribed into the Conservative field—family values, law and order, individual responsibility; the Labour ideological offensive also separated these motifs from the obscene phantasmatic subtext which sustained them in the Conservative field—in which ‘toughness on crime’ and ‘individual responsibility’ subtly referred to brutal egotism, to the disdain for victims, and other ‘basic instincts’. The problem, however, is that the New Labour strategy involved its own ‘message between the lines’: we fully accept the logic of Capital, we will not mess about with it. Today, financial crisis is a permanent state of things the reference to which legitimizes the demands to cut social spending, health care, support of culture and scientific research, in short, the dismantling of the welfare state. Is, however, this permanent crisis really an objective feature of our socio-economic life? Is it not rather one of the effects of the shift of balance in the ‘class struggle’ towards Capital, resulting from the growing role of new technologies as well as from the direct internationalization of Capital and the co-dependent diminished role of the Nation-State which was further able to impose certain minimal requirements and limitations to exploitation? In other words, the crisis is an ‘objective fact’ if and only if one accepts in advance as an unquestionable premise the inherent logic of Capital—as more and more left-wing or liberal parties have done. We are thus witnessing the uncanny spectacle of social-democratic parties which came to power with the between-the-lines message to Capital ‘we will do the necessary job for you in an even more efficient and painless way than the conservatives’. The problem, of course, is that, in today’s global socio-political circumstances, it is practically impossible effectively to call into question the logic of Capital: even a modest social-democratic attempt to redistribute wealth beyond the limit acceptable to the Capital ‘effectively’ leads to economic crisis, inflation, a fall in revenues and so on. Nevertheless, one should always bear in mind how the connection between ‘cause’ (rising social expenditure) and ‘effect’ (economic crisis) is not a direct objective causal one: it is always-already embedded in a situation of social antagonism and struggle. The fact that, if one does not obey the limits set by Capital, a crisis ‘really follows’, in no way ‘proves’ that the necessity of these limits is an objective necessity of economic life. It should rather be conceived as a proof of the privileged position Capital holds in the economic and political struggle, as in the situation where a stronger partner threatens that if you do X, you will be punished by Y, and then, upon your doing X, Y effectively ensues.

### Heg

#### US hegemony is ultimately a tool to sustain capitalist growth through endless genocidal wars

Meszaros, prof @ U. Sussex, 07

(Professor Emeritus(Istvan Meszaros, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and Professor Emeritus at U. Sussex. “The Only Viable Economy,” Monthly Review, http://www.monthlyreview.org/0407meszaros.htm)

The quixotic advocacy of freezing production at the level attained in the early 1970s was trying to camouflage, with vacuous pseudo-scientific model-mongering pioneered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the ruthlessly enforced actual power relations of U.S. dominated postwar imperialism. That variety of imperialism was, of course, very different from its earlier form known to Lenin. For in Lenin's lifetime at least half a dozen significant imperialist powers were competing for the rewards of their real and/or hoped for conquests. And even in the 1930s Hitler was still willing to share the fruits of violently redefined imperialism with Japan and Mussolini's Italy. In our time, by contrast, we have to face up to the reality -- and the lethal dangers -- arising from global hegemonic imperialism, with the United States as its overwhelmingly dominant power.7 In contrast to even Hitler, the United States as the single hegemon is quite unwilling to share global domination with any rival. And that is not simply on account of political/military contingencies. The problems are much deeper. They assert themselves through the ever-aggravating contradictions of the capital system's deepening structural crisis. U.S. dominated global hegemonic imperialism is an -- ultimately futile -- attempt to devise a solution to that crisis through the most brutal and violent rule over the rest of the world, enforced with or without the help of slavishly "willing allies," now through a succession of genocidal wars. Ever since the 1970s the United States has been sinking ever deeper into catastrophic indebtedness. The fantasy solution publicly proclaimed by several U.S. presidents was "to grow out of it." And the result: the diametrical opposite, in the form of astronomical and still growing indebtedness. Accordingly, the United States must grab to itself, by any means at its disposal, including the most violent military aggression, whenever required for this purpose, everything it can, through the transfer of the fruits of capitalist growth -- thanks to the global socioeconomic and political/military domination of the United States -- from everywhere in the world. Could then any sane person imagine, no matter how well armored by his or her callous contempt for "the shibboleth of equality," that U.S. dominated global hegemonic imperialism would take seriously even for a moment the panacea of "no growth"? Only the worst kind of bad faith could suggest such ideas, no matter how pretentiously packaged in the hypocritical concern over "the Predicament of Mankind." For a variety of reasons there can be no question about the importance of growth both in the present and in the future. But to say so must go with a proper examination of the concept of growth not only as we know it up to the present, but also as we can envisage its sustainability in the future. Our siding with the need for growth cannot be in favor of unqualified growth. The tendentiously avoided real question is: what kind of growth is both feasible today, in contrast to dangerously wasteful and even crippling capitalist growth visible all around us? For growth must be also positively sustainable in the future on a long-term basis.

### 1NR

#### Natural gas in electricity now- compensating for oversupply of plants

Smith 2012 [Rebecca Smith Wall Street Journal 3-15-2012 “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html]

One reason utilities are finding it hard to resist cheap gas is that there is a surplus of gas-fired generating capacity in many parts of the nation, the result of a building boom that lasted from 1998 to 2005. Due in part to deregulation and inexpensive capital, in 2001 alone utilities added 60,000 gas-fired megawatts, equivalent to more than 120 big plants.¶ But the 2002 collapse of Enron Corp., the big energy marketer, led to a credit squeeze that eventually pushed some of the biggest and most indebted power-plant builders into bankruptcy court, including NRG Energy; Calpine CPN +1.30% Corp.; PG&E Corp.'s PCG -0.16% National Energy Group; and Mirant Corp.¶ "The beauty of inexpensive gas now is utilities are able to take advantage of overbuilding 10 years ago," says Curt Launer, managing director of equities research at Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. in New York. "Any utility that can use gas is trying to use more of it."

#### Experts agree- nuc will disrupt the natural gas market.

 Levi 2012 [Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein¶ senior fellow for energy and the environment¶ and director of the Program on Energy Security¶ and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign¶ Relations July 2012 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists “Splitting rock vs. splitting¶ atoms: What shale gas means¶ for nuclear power” Ebsco]

Deutch and Rowe are far from alone¶ ¶ in the energy world. There is increasingly widespread agreement among energy experts that the United States will enjoy moderate natural gas prices for decades and that nuclear power will be unable to compete. If substantial¶ ¶ shale gas supplies are developed in¶ ¶ other countries, or increasingly robust¶ ¶ global markets for natural gas push overseas prices down, the cost differential¶ ¶ between natural gas and nuclear power¶ ¶ could replicate itself elsewhere. It has become impossible to speculate intelligently about the future of nuclear power without first understanding the ongoing revolution in natural gas.

### Russia Mod Impact Calc

#### We control magnitude of all conflicts

Bostrom ‘2 [Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Most probable impact- their evidence is outdated

**Sutyagin and Patel 2012** (Igor Sutyagin, Russian Studies Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, PhD in History of Foreign Policy and International Relations from the Institute for US and Canadian Studies in Moscow, and Avnish Patel, Project Manager in Military Science at Royal United Services Institute, Masters in International Relations from University of Bristol, March 26, 2012, “Putin's Presidential Return: Implications for Russian Foreign Policy and Missile Defence,” Royal United Services Institute, google)

In a policy paper leading up to the recent Russian presidential elections, Vladimir Putin reiterated his criticism of the NATO ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, arguing that it undermines Russia's strategic nuclear forces and that he is 'loath to dismiss the possibility of reaching a compromise on missile defence. One would not like to see the deployment of the American system on a scale that would demand the implementation of our declared countermeasures'.[1] Statements in this vein play up to the suspicion of Western governments and are deflective in purpose, detracting away from domestic concerns including those of the economy and the general disenchantment with the political system and ruling elites. Putin has also been critical of the United States, accusing it of meddling in Russia's internal affairs by supporting the protests during the elections. Russian interests in the international arena coalesces around three fundamental priorities: an emphasis on its strategic nuclear arsenal (partly to de-emphasise a dilution in its conventional forces and to drive a hard bargaining position related to missile defence ); oil and gas supplies, which account for two-thirds of Russia's exports, and how they can be potentially withheld to further strategic aims if necessary; and Russia's membership of the United Nations Security Council and usage of its veto, recently utilised in curtailing action in Syria. An erosion of any of these stances would limit Russia's ability to influence, coerce and cajole. This was exemplified by both Putin and outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev recently announcing that a staggering $790 billion would be spent over the next eight years on Russia's military capabilities, including modernising the military-industrial complex, acquisition and operational costs. BMD and Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Russia has appropriated a dual track strategy to counter the evolving deployment of a US-led NATO BMD system. Firstly, by applying an ambiguous policy to stop or deter BMD deployment, the intention here is to divide NATO members so as to avoid the alliance from unifying wholesale behind US leadership. Secondly, to send out a robust message that Russian strategic nuclear weapons are highly effective. Practical steps to fulfil the latter aim have recently been undertaken. Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, announced in February the plan to acquire for the Russian Navy ten Borey-class strategic submarines (SSBNs), armed with R-30 Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Just two months earlier it had been envisaged that eight submarines would be built.[2]The Russian Navy will also resume permanent combat patrols of its strategic submarines later this year, which were suspended 26 years ago.[3] From 1986, the Soviet and then the Russian Navy deployed SSBNs for combat patrols on a temporary basis, with periods of time when none took place at all. These developments indicate a genuine fear of intercept ballistic missiles as epitomised by the fledgling NATO system. The Russian rationale is that sea-based ballistic missiles are more difficult to intercept as the precise position of their possible starts are unknown for the intercepting side. Reset Derailed? The 'reset' between Washington and Moscow was brokered by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, both basking in the glow of a warm personal relationship, with the latter pushing for a more engaging Russian foreign policy. This culminated in the signing of the New START agreement in 2010, but this should be seen as a temporary blip in an otherwise rocky relationship. The obstinate and bullish rhetoric used by Putin recently suggests that cordial relations with both the US and NATO will not be handled with finesse now that a leadership change has been affected in the Kremlin. In order to maintain a grip on his authority, it is likely that Putin will once again resort to the politics of fear reminiscent of the Cold War era and escalate the rhetoric used by Dmitri Medvedev prior to the State Duma elections in late 2011. Medvedev sought to draw the sting out of a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence system and seek concessions by threatening to withdraw from the aforementioned START Agreement, deploying countermeasures such as stationing Iskander missiles in the western exclave of Kaliningrad and pushing for a legally-binding declaration that a NATO system will never be utilised against Russia. It is inherently difficult for NATO to offer such specific guarantees. Prior to the Presidential elections, Russian Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov also warned the US against stationing Aegis-equipped ships in Arctic territories and Black Sea as well as attempting to dissuade Norway not to bow to US pressure to equip its own maritime assets with Aegis systems. Most recently, Dmitry Medvedev has announced that whilst still being open to dialogue with NATO, Russia will seek to develop counter-measures by 2017-2018. The deployment of new ICBMs tasked with countering BMD assetswould ominously complement the third and fourth phases of the US European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which would be in place to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats.[4] Following Putin's election victory and integral to his own cult of personality is theability to stand up to perceived NATO encroachment. The ingrained fear of a NATO BMD system comes from cold war paranoia and genuine concerns. The prickly demeanour of Putin's leadership style will continue to help cultivate a narrative of the perceived unfairness of a BMD defence system on Russia's borders and sphere of influence, arguing that NATO is unresponsive to its concerns. The EPAA and deployment of anti-missile interceptors and advanced radars in Poland, Romania and Turkey is seen as another affront to its regional hegemony, already undermined by NATO's provocative flirtation with Ukraine, Georgia (with a nod to the contretemps in 2008) and the Baltic States. The Russians insist that their offers of cooperation, based on a joint system, have been rebuffed, but such an arrangement is anathema to NATO, with the obvious insistence that Russia would not have command-and-control over the defence of NATO territory. This issue and the continuing evolvement of US EPAA assets and their integration into a NATO BMD system, will be discussed at length at the forthcoming 2012 RUSI Missile Defence Conference on 30-31 May. Tangible co-operation would require a consensus on threat assessments, clarification on command-and-control issues and technical co-operation. The limited sharing of classified data as part of a defence technical co-operation agreement has recently been alluded to by the Obama Administration in yet another effort to temper Russian intransigency. This is a thorny issue which would require placating a wary and partisan Congress, with certain members opposed to providing information such as the burnout velocity of SM-3 interceptors, an integral component of the NATO system. Practical and meaningful cooperation is possible if Russia cedes from viewing NATO and 'the West' in an adversarial light, but this would require a major attitudinal change in the present leadership. The recent announcement that the Russian Ministry of Defence is to hold an international BMD conference prior to the NATO Chicago Summit is evidence of Russia's continued unease over NATO's BMD architecture. The conference, being a pre-emptive move to steal NATO's thunder, will no doubt provide an opportunity to foment domestic public opinion against a NATO system as well as ramp up the rhetoric regarding proposed Russian capabilities (but remaining light on detailed technical specifics). It is likely to be the first shot in a diplomatic barrage in May that will also see Putin, after being sworn in for a third Presidential term, heading assertively and confidently to the G8 Summit at Camp David. The fact that the G8 gathering is not in Chicago is a deft ploy by the Obama administration, making it easier for Putin's non-attendance at the NATO Summit and for him to save face with NATO's intent to declare an interim missile defence capability during that time. Looking ahead post-Chicago, low-level cooperation activities such as simulated joint exercises will become infrequent or cease but Russia will later respond with further proposals (mainly to resume the postponed co-operative programmes). Russia will continue to insist that it wants to cooperate with missile defence dialogues as disconnection is commensurate with losing influence. Ultimately, Russia under the current leadership is politically interested in talks about co-operation rather than actual co-operation itself.

Checks aff flex – they can read add ons, link turns – condigtionality lets us adapt with our remaining rebuttal.

Double consistency – we should be able to test if their 2ac answers on one position create argumentative tension elsewhere – this increases depth of analysis and strategic analysis skills.

Checks theory voters – the alternative is that CP objections become voting issues.

Plan focus – disads to CP don’t justify a plan worse than the SQ, which is always a logical option.

Infinite prep time to get their plan right – we have to write it on the fly and adapt to their clarifications.

All args are conditional – we can kick T or disads and they kick advantages

Neg will offset by holding back the CP until the 2NC, after the net benefits are answered – that’s worse for aff strategy.

2AC skew impact turn – its our job, and their to figure out a coherent 2ac position.

Dispo checks nothing – it’s incoherent due to multiple defs, overly ties aff strategic options, lets affs win even if the plan is a bad idea, and perms on net benefit CP’s don’t disprove competition per se so it’s incoherent.

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve war – causes instability and prolif – drags US in causes bigger conflicts

Ben Friedman (research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in political science, MIT) July 2010 “Military Restraint and Defense Savings” 20 July 2010, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrest than they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival. Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us — either directly or by forcing us to become a garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

### Nuc det

#### Deterrence doesn’t solve prolif – spurs hard-liners.

Colin Kahl, March/April 2012, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at Center for a New American Security; former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack Iran,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran>

Even if a U.S. strike went as well as Kroenig predicts, there is little guarantee that it would produce lasting results. Senior U.S. defense officials have repeatedly stated that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would stall Tehran's progress for only a few years. Kroenig argues that such a delay could become permanent. "Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked -- most recently Iraq and Syria," he writes, "have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs." In the case of Iraq, however, Saddam Hussein restarted his clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and it required the Gulf War and another decade of sanctions and intrusive inspections to eliminate it. Iran's program is also more advanced and dispersed than were Iraq's and Syria's, meaning it would be easier to reconstitute. A U.S. strike would damage key Iranian facilities, but it would do nothing to reverse the nuclear knowledge Iran has accumulated or its ability to eventually build new centrifuges. A U.S. attack would also likely rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hard-liners, increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to building a bomb. Kroenig downplays the "rally round the flag" risks by noting that hard-liners are already firmly in power and suggesting that an attack might produce increased internal criticism of the regime. But the nuclear program remains an enormous source of national pride for the majority of Iranians. To the extent that there is internal dissent over the program, it is a discussion about whether the country should acquire nuclear weapons or simply pursue civilian nuclear technology. By demonstrating the vulnerability of a non-nuclear-armed Iran, a U.S. attack would provide ammunition to hard-liners who argue for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Kroenig suggests that the United States should essentially ignore "Iran's domestic political tussles" when pursuing "its vital national security interest in preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons." But influencing Iranian opinion about the strategic desirability of nuclear weapons might ultimately offer the only enduring way of keeping the Islamic Republic on a peaceful nuclear path. Finally, if Iran did attempt to restart its nuclear program after an attack, it would be much more difficult for the United States to stop it. An assault would lead Iran to distance itself from the IAEA and perhaps to pull out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty altogether. Without inspectors on the ground, the international community would struggle to track or slow Tehran's efforts to rebuild its program.

### Econ

-high prevalence of exotic foreign holdings, credit default swapping, affiliate lending, investor fire-selling

#### Common creditors key to transmit shocks—our decoupling and diversification warrants as well as historical examples prove these are scarce and the U.S. is not one

Rose and Spiegel 8 (CROSS-COUNTRY CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2008 CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES AND AMERICAN EXPOSURE; Andrew K. Rose, prof econ analysis University of California, Mark M. Spiegel, vice president international research, FRB San Francisco; Pacific Economic Review, p. 340-363, ebsco)

A number of studies (e.g. Davis, 2008) argue that the international interbank market might be a source of contagion and the global transmission of shocks. These markets typically lack collateral, and moral hazard is often introduced through implicit government guarantees of liquidity. This leads banks to conduct business in this market under conditions of low liquidity and poor information. As such, when credit disruptions affect particular banks, other banks often respond by rationing extensions of credit (rather than stiffening borrowing terms). The market can then seize up, with the result that international extensions of credit cease, as in the Asian Financial crisis of 1997. In that crisis, weakly-capitalized Japanese banks immediately cancelled credit lines of as much as 10% of GDP (Reisen, 2008). The notion that linkages might exist through mutual dependence on foreign creditors is not new. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) divide borrowing countries into one set that predominantly borrows from Japanese banks and another that predominantly borrows from US banks. They ﬁnd that once a number of countries in a given cohort exhibit crisis characteristics, the unconditional probability that an unaffected country in that cohort will also fall into crisis increases dramatically. Caramazza et al. (2000) also examine exposure to a common creditor, measured as: (i) the share of a country’s borrowing from the country that lent most to the ground zero country, (ii) the importance of the borrower for that creditor country, and (iii) the product of these two measures. They conﬁrm that exposure to a common creditor is a signiﬁcant source of contagion. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) develop an indicator of competition for funds, which measures the overall similarity between the borrowing patterns of the country in question and the ground zero country, using a methodology analogous to the measure of the intensity of trade competition with the ground zero country used in the literature cited above. Similarly, Peek and Rosengren (1997) examine the case of the Japanese banking crisis, and ﬁnd that disruptions to banking ‘parents’ had an adverse impact on their lending through subsidiaries in the United States. They conclude that there may well be a role for contagion for ﬁnancial linkages over and above that identiﬁed for trade linkages and, indeed, that some of the contagion previously identiﬁed as attributable to trade linkages might actually stem from ﬁnancial linkages, as the two are highly correlated in the data. However, in practice it has proven difﬁcult to empirically disentangle contagion due to trade linkages from that attributable to ﬁnancial linkages, as countries that are closely linked in one dimension tend to also be linked in the other (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). In addition, it should be noted that not all potential crises actually metastasize into serious international ﬁnancial crises. As discussed by Kaminsky et al. (2003), there have been a number of potentially major ﬁnancial crises (such as the 1999 Brazilian devaluation and the 2001 Argentine default) that did not have dramatic international implications in practice. They note that one common distinction between cases where domestic ﬁnancial crises did and did not lead to international spillovers was whether or not there were other borrowers exposed to a common leveraged creditor. These common leveraged creditors helped to foster contagion, as difﬁculties experienced in one borrowing country led to deteriorated bank balance sheet positions. In that sense, they reconcile the absence of contagion with a ‘fundamental’; namely, the lack of a common creditor to spread the shock internationally

#### Econ resilient

Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.